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REFORMING LAW PRACTICE IN THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: THE PERILS OF
PRIVILEGING "PUBLIC" OVER
PROFESSIONAL VALUES
Ted Schneyer*
I have no direct answer to the grand question the Law Review
editors put to the Colloquium participants: "What does it mean to

practice law 'in the interests of justice' in the twenty-first century?"
Answering the question to my own satisfaction would require a
definition of justice, which I am not prepared to offer and defend.'
Indeed, with lawyers now working in a vast array of settings and

specialty fields, and so many nonlawyer

2

competing or cooperating

with lawyers to provide "professional services," I would hesitate to

venture a definition of law practice!
Deborah Rhode is braver than I. In her recent book, In the Interests

of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession3 Professor Rhode has
much to say about what is wrong with law practice in the United

States, and what changes would move us in the right direction. But,
although she says all this in the name of promoting justice, she does so

without systematic attention to the meaning of the term. Her focus is
intensely practical. Examining current conditions in private law
practice,4 the lawyer's role in the adversary system, 5 the delivery of
* Milton 0. Riepe Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College
of Law.
1. For an ambitious and illuminating effort to define justice for purposes of
making that endlessly contested term a meaningful guide in law practice, see William
H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics (1998).
2. For example, many lay advocates now represent clients in labor arbitrations
and quasi-judicial proceedings before state and federal agencies. See Herbert M.
Kritzer, Legal Advocacy: Lawyers and Nonlawyers at Work (1998) (comparing the
effectiveness of lawyers and lay advocates in administrative proceedings).
3. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
(2000).
4. Id at 24-25. These include enormous stress, little job security, increasingly
bureaucratized workplaces, an eroding commitment to public service, impersonal and
unstable relationships with clients, and unprecedented billing pressures. See id. at 813, 23-38. Rhode attributes these conditions, in part, to fierce competition for clients.
Id at 9. Today's competitive environment was fostered by judicial decisions in the
1970s and 1980s that struck down restrictions on solicitation, lawyer advertising, and
below-minimum fees. Many observers at the time welcomed those decisions because
they promised to encourage competition, which would drive down fees and make

1831

1832

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

legal services, the regulation of lawyers, and the structure of legal
education, she detects a need for substantial change and identifies
many potential reforms for the reader's consideration.
Echoing George Bernard Shaw's sentiment that professions are
"conspiracies against the laity,"'6 Professor Rhode's "central premise"
is that reform is not only needed, but has been far too slow in coming
because "the public's interest has played too little part in determining
[lawyers'] professional responsibilities. '7 Rhode believes that "[t]oo
much regulation of lawyers has been designed by and for lawyers '
and that the "self-regarding tendencies of [professional selfregulation] have been too long overlooked." 9 Drawing attention to
what she views as a sharp dichotomy, she aims to encourage "more
searching analysis by both the profession and the public about the
points at which their interests diverge."' 0 While the profession has not
been oblivious to its dwindling public esteem, Rhode considers recent
bar initiatives to "rekindle professionalism"' 1 and restore lawyer
legal services more widely available, thereby enhancing access to justice.
5. Although her treatment of contemporary law practice is extensive, Professor
Rhode gives surprisingly little attention to some important roles lawyers play outside
of the adversary system-e.g., as negotiators in business transactions or as neutrals
and client representatives in mediations.
6. 1 George Bernard Shaw, The Doctor'sDilemma, in Bernard Shaw: Complete
Plays with Prefaces xv, 110 (1963).
7. Rhode, supra note 3, at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3. But certainly not overlooked by Professor Rhode, who has
emphasized this theme in her scholarship for more than two decades. See, e.g.,
Deborah L. Rhode, EthicalPerspectives on Legal Practice,37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 643
(1985) [hereinafter Rhode, Ethical Perspectives] (insisting that lawyers stop
"retreatfing] into role" and begin to "assume personal moral responsibility for the
consequences of their professional actions"); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA
Bothers: A FunctionalPerspective on ProfessionalCodes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689 (1981)
(identifying lawyer self-interest as the motivation for drafting codes of legal ethics).
Elaborating on her charge that "the public's interest plays too small a role" in
defining or enforcing lawyers' responsibilities, Rhode rightly asserts that nonlawyers
play only a token role in lawyer regulation-e.g., by sitting in small numbers on bar
disciplinary committees. She does not consider the growing interest of the press in
publicizing lawyer misconduct, monitoring the regulatory activities of the organized
bar, and covering bar policy debates. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar
Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 677, 695-97, 723-24 (1989) [hereinafter Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar
Politics] (discussing press coverage of ABA debate regarding proposed ethics rules).
10. Rhode, supra note 3, at 3. Though she criticizes the profession in many
respects, Rhode does not always side with the public when she discerns a divergence
between public and professional opinion. For example, she regrets the fact that much
of the public, unlike the bar, opposes government-subsidized legal services for the
poor. See infra note 21 and accompanying text. On a few occasions, moreover, she
downplays apparent conflicts between public and professional interests by suggesting
that changes beneficial to the public would really benefit lawyers as well. E.g., Rhode,
supra note 3, at 45 (suggesting that many lawyers, unhappy with their careers, would
benefit along with their clients from "plac[ing] greater emphasis on values other than
profit").
11. Comm'n On Professionalism, ABA, "... In the Spirit of Public Service": A
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civility a largely cosmetic response to serious problems.' 2 Effective
reform will require "fundamental changes in ethical rules,
enforcement structures, and economic incentives" 3 -changes
designed to align professional conduct with public values and
"commonly accepted ethical principles" as Rhode understands them.
After commenting briefly on Professor Rhode's treatment of the
supply of legal services and the regulation of law practice, with which I

am in considerable sympathy, I focus in this Essay on her critique of
lawyers' ethics in matters, including adversary proceedings, in which
client interests may conflict with the interests of third parties or the
public. My reaction to that critique is mixed. Rhode's vivid accounts
of lawyers' adversarial excesses on behalf of clients in large-stakes
civil litigation are beyond cavil. 4 In my view, however, her critique
does not point the way to any reconstruction of legal ethics that could
command wide support inside or outside the profession. Instead, it
illustrates the enormous difficulty of defining a shared conception of
justice upon which to ground lawyers' responsibilities in a nation as
politically diverse and a legal culture as jurisprudentially conflicted as
ours.

Rhode fully appreciates the vagaries of public opinion as they bear
on problems associated with the delivery of legal services in this
country.' 5 Most Americans would agree with her that, in our highly
legalistic society, access to those services is an important good. 6 And
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986).
12. Rhode, supra note 3, at 17.
13. Id at 82.
14. Id at 82-98. I part company with Rhode, however, when, in an effort to
undermine the argument that zealous advocacy in an adversary process promotes
truth-finding, she suggests that, if the argument had much merit, then trial lawyers
would hire competing investigators to collect evidence. This suggestion reflects a
failure to distinguish between two kinds of disputes. In Type I disputes, a resolution
exists that will uniformly enhance the outcomes for all interested parties, while other
resolutions will reduce those outcomes. An example is a dispute between hunters
about which path will lead them out of the woods. In Type II disputes, which are
typical in litigation, the interests of the parties are opposed because any particular
resolution is apt to enhance the outcome for one party at the expense of the other.
Psychological research has suggested that in Type II disputes, adversarial presentation
by the parties is apt to bring out important contextual factors that "are likely to be
overlooked when information is developed from the narrower perspective" of the
adjudicator, as it tends to be developed in non-adversarial systems. See John Thibaut
& Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure,66 Cal. L Rev. 541, 54345, 550 (1978).
15. She is also discriminating in her support for measures that would increase the
availability of legal services or reduce the need for them. She is skeptical, for
example, about relying on no-fault compensation systems and alternative dispute
resolution as alternatives to litigation. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 130 (stating that the
former might reduce "deterrence and responsibility for wrongful conduct" while the
latter might "offer insufficient procedural protections" for those who are
unsophisticated or vulnerable to decisionmakers' biases).
16. See id at 53.
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access could be improved if the public were mobilized to oppose the
unnecessarily broad restrictions that Rhode rightly criticizes the bar
and the courts for imposing on the provision of legal and law-related
services.1 7 But mobilization is not in the cards, for reasons having less
to do with professional resistance than with public attitudes. Public
knowledge concerning the utilization and supply of legal services is
abysmal, as Rhode illustrates by refuting the widely accepted claim
that the United States is far more litigious and has more lawyers per
capita than comparable nations. 18 And Americans are "deeply
divided" on access-to-justice issues.1 9 We may agree, Rhode writes,
that everyone deserves "reasonable opportunities" for access to
justice in order to satisfy "significant legal needs," but such terms
mask a "host of complexities."' 0 For example, many Americans are
hostile to government-subsidized legal services for the poor, which the
bar has long supported."1
Professor Rhode finds serious weaknesses in the regulation of law
practice, and she holds the courts largely responsible for having
delegated too much authority to the bar, thereby spawning a cluster of
"bar-controlled oversight structures" that inadequately protect
societal interests and ineffectively respond to lawyer misconduct.Y
17. See id. at 135-41 (discussing overly restrictive bans on unauthorized practice of
law).
18. Id. at 120-29.

19. Id. at 130.
20. Id. at 130-31.
21. Id. at 7 (quoting a legal aid lawyer's assessment that "[tihe only thing less
popular than a poor person these days is a poor person with a lawyer," and noting
that we spend far less per capita than other Western industrial societies on subsidized
legal representation). Prior to 1970, the bar was at times hostile to public subsidies,
just as the medical profession feared that "socialized medicine" would unduly
constrain professional autonomy. Since the 1970s, the bar has supported funding for
the Legal Services Corporation, most notably in the face of opposition by the Reagan
administration. See Andrew L. Kaufman & Gerry Singsen, Legal Services in the 1980s,
in Andrew L. Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility 547-50 (3d ed. 1989).
22. Rhode, supra note 3, at 19-20. Rhode presumably has in mind the ABA and
traditional state and local bar associations, which formulate general standards for law
practice, interpret them in ethics opinions, and enforce them in disciplinary
proceedings. However, more specialized bar groups are gaining prominence and
Rhode holds out some hope that they can influence practice for the better. She is
heartened by the respect shown for the public interest, not just for lawyer and client
interests, in practice guidelines that an ABA Tax Section committee and the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers have issued for lawyers in their fieldsguidelines that could influence the standard of care to which lawyers are held in legal
malpractice cases. Id. at 21. But she gives us no reason to expect specialty bars as a
class to develop standards that are superior to the ethics codes designed for lawyers
generally. Specialty groups may have a better grasp than general-purpose bar
associations of the issues that confront lawyers in their fields, but it does not follow
that they will produce standards more respectful of public as opposed to professional
interests. The American College of Trial Lawyers and the American Trial Lawyers
Association have formulated standards for trial practice, but Rhode criticizes both
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These self-regulatory structures are not the only means of governing
lawyers,' of course, but the bar takes pains to maintain their
prominence in the regulatory mix.24 They include the ethics codes the
ABA formulates for judicial adoption and the bar-administered
disciplinary process in which those codes are enforced. 5
Rhode's critique of the disciplinary process is forceful. She rightly
decries the secrecy of the process, its reactive approach to
enforcement, its reluctance to pursue grievances concerning a lawyer's
fees or competence, its often inadequate funding, and its meager
arsenal of sanctions3 Among those raising similar criticisms, some
would go so far as to abandon the process.2 7 Others call for reform,
recognizing that the process does serve a distinctive need by
governing lawyers' relations with unsophisticated clients
and
specialty groups for treating "undivided fidelity to each client's interests as the client
perceives them" as the fundamental norm in trial practice. Id. at 15, 50 (internal
quotations omitted).
23. Lawyers are also constrained by antitrust, malpractice, and fiduciary law, rules
of judicial procedure, and rules issued by certain administrative agencies, in addition
to market forces and reputational concerns. See Ted Schneyer, Foreword: Legal
Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 Fordham L Rev. 33, 35-36
(1996).
24. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The
ABA 's Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 Ariz. L Rev. 363, 363-64 & n.6
(1993) (referring to an ABA resolution urging that, in the interest of preserving an
independent bar, lawyers be regulated through a judicially created bar disciplinary
process and not by the other branches of government); see also Rhode, supra note 3,
at 158 (referring to a survey of California lawyers, only twenty percent of whom
thought the state bar was effectively administering the disciplinary system, but ninety
percent of whom thought the bar should continue to administer it!).
25. For my evaluations of lawyers' self-regulatory institutions, see Ted Schneyer,
Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1991) (calling for
extension of disciplinary jurisdiction to law firms); Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar
Politics,supra note 9 (reviewing ABA's process for formulating a new ethics code);
Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in
RegulatingLawyer Conduct: A Critiqueof the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics
and ProfessionalResponsibility, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 67 (1981) (identifying weaknesses
in ABA ethics opinions of the 1970s and in the procedures by which the opinions
were developed).
26. Rhode, supra note 3, at 158-61. Professor Rhode also asserts that weaknesses
in the disciplinary process have increased the number of civil suits and federal
administrative proceedings against lawyers. Id. at 20. I doubt this. As she recognizes,
malpractice suits are usually too expensive to pursue in order to remedy the low-level
problems that typify disciplinary grievances. Id. at 159. And, in my opinion, federal
agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service, Patent Trademark Office, and
Securities Exchange Commission would seek some control over the lawyers (and the
many nonlawyers) who practice in their fields, even if the traditional disciplinary
process were more effective, just as judges seek direct control over trial lawyers by
enforcing procedural rules and invoking their contempt power.
27. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law
Professors, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2583, 2591-99 (1996) (calling for dismantling the
disciplinary process in favor of greater reliance on civil liability as a regulatory tool).
28. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L.Rev. 799, 874
(1992) (stating that clients with complaints about "inattention, low-level negligence,
overpayment, or conversion of trust funds vill often be better served by the kind of
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disbarring "bad apples." Rhode is in the latter camp. She supports a
number of sensible reforms to beef up enforcement and better inform
the public about the process and the disciplinary records of individual
lawyers. 9 To date, the bar has been able to block some of these
reforms, but one cannot chalk this up to our traditional reliance on
judicial as opposed to legislative oversight of the legal profession. As
Rhode notes, "[liegislatively created oversight agencies [for other
professions] often suffer from the same problems of underfunding,
delays, and capture by regulated groups."30
With respect to the ABA ethics codes, Rhode is particularly critical
of rules governing the duty of confidentiality that lawyers owe to their
clients.31 When her book was published in 2000, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct forbad lawyers to reveal confidential
information in order to protect the public from being victimized by
client wrongdoing except as necessary "to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that... is likely to result in imminent death
or substantial bodily harm."32 No disclosures were allowed in order to
(1) prevent client crimes or frauds that would substantially harm
third-party property or financial interests, (2) prevent death or
substantial bodily harm that would otherwise result from non-criminal
acts such as accidental spills of toxic waste, or (3) mitigate or rectify
economic losses from client crimes or frauds in which the lawyer's
services were used.33 Professor Rhode considers the protection that
the Model Rules provide for client confidences far too absolute from a
public perspective, though quite understandable from a professional
perspective because it gives lawyers "maximum scope to protect their
own interests and those of paying clients."'
I agree that further
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality would be desirable.35 But I
do not put much stock in the public opinion survey data she offers in
support of her position.
Nor do I share her certitude that
confidentiality rules written by laymen would require a broader range
of disclosures for the protection of societal interests.
One rationale for requiring lawyers to keep client confidences is the
assumption that clients would otherwise be less candid about their
flexible, informal, and relatively inexpensive procedures found in many disciplinary

agencies than.., by malpractice suits").
29. Rhode, supra note 3, at 162-65.
30. Id. at 161.
31. Id. at 106-15.
32. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
33. Ethics rules promulgated by some state supreme courts contain broader
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality than the Model Rules, but the exceptions
"still are strikingly limited." Rhode, supra note 3, at 110.
34. Id.; see also id. at 113 (calling further exceptions "steps in the right direction").
35. I support exceptions permitting disclosure in the circumstances enumerated
above; Rhode would go further and require lawyers to whistleblow on their clients in
a number of circumstances in which the law does not currently permit or require
disclosure. Id. at 114.
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conduct and intentions, thereby affording lawyers fewer opportunities

to counsel them against taking unlawful or unduly harmful courses of
action. It is notoriously difficult to evaluate this assumption or, more
precisely, to gauge the magnitude of the chilling effect on client
communication that would result from recognizing broader exceptions
to the duty of confidentiality. Rhode suggests the effect would be
insignificant, but her discussion only illustrates the difficulty.

As

evidence that such exceptions would not significantly reduce client
candor, she notes that "only about a third" of the clients surveyed in a
study in upstate New York reported that they had given information
to their lawyers that they would have withheld without a guarantee of
confidentiality. 6 Yet one could interpret this finding differently:
"Gee, as many as a third. And most of those respondents were

probably not referring to information nearly as sensitive as an
intention to commit a crime.
Confidentiality must really be
important!"37
Professor Rhode considers the bar an unsatisfactory source of
confidentiality rules where third-party interests are concerned because
lawyers have a financial and ideological bias against making, or even
contemplating, disclosures that their clients would regard as
betrayals.38 She thinks rulemakers more concerned "with the public
interest undoubtedly would" permit and even require more
disclosure. 9 But it is far from clear that lay rulemakers would be
"
more concerned with "the public interest" as Rhode understands it.
Rhode suggests that the best confidentiality rules would emerge
from a hypothetical process in which the rulemakers stood behind
philosopher John Rawls's "veil of ignorance"-i.e., acted without

36. Id. at 111; see also Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L
Rev. 351 (1989)
37. Lawyers and clients in the New York study were also given a hypothetical case
in which the client, an airplane manufacturer, learns from a confidential investigation
that one of the parts in its planes might explode at high altitudes. However, the part
meets federal safety standards and the client decides that the data is too inconclusive
to warrant public disclosure of the risk. Rhode finds it notable that only fifteen
percent of the surveyed clients said that, if the law permitted the company's lawyer to
disclose the risk to the public, they would be less willing to use a lawyer's services.
Rhode, supra note 3, at 113. But, as the author of the study conceded, the other
eighty-five percent "may well have assumed they would never be in a similar
situation" or assumed that if they ever were in such a situation they could withhold
the sensitive information from their lawyer. Zacharias, supra note 36, at 395 n.227.
38. Rhode, supra note 3, at 109-10.
39. See id. at 113 (identifying disclosure requirements recommended by ethics
experts and bodies that have approached the issue from "a disinterested
perspective").
40. One reason why I presume that Rhode would favor a process for drafting
confidentiality rules in which lawyers' views were subordinated to lay views is that she
embraces philosopher Sissela Bok's position that the professions are "too insular and
self-interested to make appropriate assessments" of their own confidentiality
obligations. Id. at 112-13.
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considering their positions in society and how the rules would affect
them personally.41 But lay rulemakers might be no more able or
willing than lawyers to stand behind the veil. And without the veil,
they might very well act on their perceived interests as prospective
clients with secrets to protect rather than as people who could be
42
adversely affected by the unanticipated conduct of a lawyer's client.
The American Trial Lawyers Foundation Code of Conduct, conceived
as an alternative to the ABA's Model Rules, was produced by a
committee that included several nonlawyers. Those nonlawyers were
reportedly "shocked by the concept that a lawyer would reveal a
client's secrets except in the most extreme circumstances. ' 43 They
reminded the committee that it was producing "not just a Code of
As one
Conduct for lawyers, but a Bill of Rights for clients."'
nonlawyer put it: "'When I need a lawyer, I need him to be
' 45 my
lawyer. And if he isn't going to be my lawyer, I don't need him.'
Conversely, there are signs that the bar, without discernible
pressure from lay organizations, is coming to accept broader
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality where vital third-party
interests are at stake. The American Law Institute's new Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers permits disclosure of confidential
client information as necessary in order to prevent death or serious
bodily harm (whether or not a crime would be involved), 46 to prevent
clients from committing crimes or frauds that threaten substantial
financial loss,47 and to rectify or mitigate the losses sustained when
such crimes or frauds occur and the lawyer's services were used to
commit them." An ABA commission recently proposed similar
exceptions for the Model Rules, 49 though with mixed results." Thus,
even if lawyer self-interest shapes the bar's confidentiality rules, it is
not inevitable that those rules will permit too little disclosure.
Lawyers' perceptions of their interests sometimes favor disclosures
41. Id. at 113.
42. See Murray L. Schwartz, Comment, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 653, 655 (1985)
(expressing doubt that the Model Rules would be very different if drafted by a team
of nonlawyers).
43. Theodore I. Koskoff, Introduction to The American Lawyer's Code of
Conduct (Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, Public Discussion
Draft 1980), reprintedin Trial, Aug. 1980, at 44, 46, 47.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 66 (2000).
47. Id. § 67(1).
48. Id. § 67(2).
49. Report of the Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, ABA, Proposed R. 1.6(b), at 21 (Nov. 2000).
50. In February 2002, the ABA House of Delegates amended Model Rule 1.6 to
permit disclosures to "prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,"
but rejected proposals to permit disclosures to prevent or rectify client crimes or
frauds that entail substantial financial loss. Compare id. with Ethics 2000-February
2002 Report 401, ABA, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-202report passed.html.
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calculated to protect third parties from client wrongdoing. The
willingness of the American Law Institute to recognize a right to blow
the whistle on clients who are defrauding others, for example, reflects
one influential lawyer's argument that lawyers must have discretion to
disclose their clients' intended or ongoing frauds in order to protect
their own reputations and avoid being sued for assisting in fraud.5"
Professor Rhode also relies on contestable contrasts between public
and professional values or interests in developing her broader critique
of professional ethics. That critique starts with the "guiding principle"
that lawyers must "accept personal moral responsibility for the
consequences of their professional acts."- Lawyers all too often
evade moral responsibility, according to Rhode, by "depend[ing] on a
retreat into role that denies the need for reflection."53 In other words,
they blindly conform to what philosopher Richard Wasserstrom has
called role-differentiated norms-i.e., rules and expectations that
require lawyers by virtue of their role to "put to one side
considerations.. . that would otherwise be relevant if not decisive."-,
The role morality that Rhode believes lawyers adhere to is, in her
view, embodied in the traditional codes of legal ethics. If lawyers'
51. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It,
6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 701, 720 (1993). Professor Hazard was Director of the
American Law Institute while the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers was
being developed. Institute members are all lawyers or judges.
52. Rhode, supra note 3, at 17. What it means to "accept moral responsibility for
one's professional acts" is by no means clear. What Rhode seems to have in mind is a
willingness to reflect consciously on the consequences of one's choices for all
concerned, both before and after those choices are made, and to acknowledge the
authority of nonlawyers to pass moral judgment on one's conduct on the basis of
"commonly accepted ethical principles." On the various meanings that accepting
moral responsibility or accountability can carry, see Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy
for the Hired Gun, 41 J. Legal Educ. 11, 12-13 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, Some
Sympathy for the Hired Gun].
53. Rhode, supra note 3, at 17.
54. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum.
Rts. 1, 3 (1975); see also Schneyer, Some Sympathy for tie Hired Gun, supra note 52,
at 12-13. Thus, insofar as rules of professional ethics encourage a lawyer to invoke
the statute of frauds to help a client avoid a debt he really owes, but commonly
accepted ethical principles (or the lawyer's own, off-the-job principles) require
repayment, the lawyer's conduct, if it is to be justified at all, will have to be justified
by reference to role-differentiated norms. Whether role-differentiated norms are a
species of moral norms and, if so, whether they are the only species, are matters of
some controversy among philosophers. Wasserstrom contrasts role-differentiated
conduct with conduct based on "the moral point of view," Wassertstrom, supra, at 12,
while Alasdair Maclntyre argues that rational moral evaluation requiresseeing actors
in social roles. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue 169-209 (1981). Of medical ethics,
Maclntyre writes that "[m]oral agency is embodied in roles such as that of the
physician, the patient or the nurse," which are "mutually interdefined in terms of
types of relationship." Alasdair Maclntyre, What Has Ethics to Learn from Medical
Ethics?, 2 Phil. Exchange 37, 46 (1978).
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energies are to be more effectively harnessed for the pursuit of justice,
Rhode argues, then lawyers will have to "satisfy commonly accepted
ethicalprinciples ["CAEPs"], not just the minimal standards set forth
in bar ethical codes. ' 55 The codes may conflict with CAEPs for two
reasons. First, code rules "reflect and reinforce" the principles of
56
Neutrality and Partisanship, which exalt client loyalty above all else.
(Neutrality encourages lawyers to act without regard to the moral
worthiness of a client or a client's objectives; Partisanship encourages
lawyers to pursue client objectives within, but all the way up to, the
limits of the law.) 57 Second, code rules can be too categorical-i.e.,
insensitive to contextual factors. According to Rhode, it is itself a
CAEP that "[e]thical obligations.., depend on context,' 58 yet the
lawyer's role under the codes disregards or downplays moral
considerations that laymen, at least, would consider highly relevant in
particular lawyering situations. 9
55. Rhode, supra note 3, at 18 (emphasis added). It is common but often
misleading to criticize standards in legal ethics codes for being "minimal." Many rules
of legal ethics represent trade-offs between such policy goals as promoting client
candor by keeping confidences, on one hand, and protecting third parties from
impending harm by disclosing confidences, on the other. One can sensibly argue that
rules defining the lawyer's duty of confidentiality give undue weight to one of these
goals, but calling the rules "minimal" obscures the fact that they reflect a trade-off.
56. Id. at 51.
57. Id.; see also Gerald J. Postema, MoralResponsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63, 82-83 (1980) (arguing that lawyers' responsibilities are "entirely
predetermined" by rules derived from these principles). For discussion of the role
these principles have played in moral philosophers' criticism of legal ethics, see Ted
Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L.
Rev. 1529, 1532-44; Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, supra note 52.
Professor Rhode's discussion of the Neutrality Principle is somewhat
confusing. She wants lawyers to make judgments about the worthiness of the aims of
prospective clients in deciding whom to represent. On the other hand, she thinks
Neutrality is a useful value when cabined to encourage lawyers to represent clients
who are so unpopular or detested that they find it difficult to obtain counsel. See
Rhode, supra note 3, at 51-54. Contrasting the approach to Neutrality in American
legal ethics codes, which caution that providing legal assistance should not be taken as
an endorsement of the client's views or activities but which permit lawyers to reject
would-be clients, with the British "cab-rank" rule, which requires barristers to accept
clients on a first-come, first-served basis, she praises the cab-rank rule as a "more
demanding principle." Id. at 60. So it is, but the rule also makes it easier for barristers
to represent clients whom Rhode might regard as unworthy of representation, since
barristers can always claim that they had no choice. In this respect, the rule may
enable barristers to take less moral responsibility for their work than their American
counterparts.
58. Rhode, supra note 3, at 51 (emphasis added); see also id. at 71 (stating that
'[u]nder generally accepted ethical principles, context is critical"). This is news to
me. The maxim "do not lie" is presumably a CAEP. Yet many people would reject
the proposition that the morality of lying always or even usually depends on the
context in which it occurs.
59. The ABA acknowledges that the Model Rules do not "exhaust the moral and
ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity
can be completely defined by legal rules." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct Scope para.
2 (2001). But neither the ABA, nor the courts that adopt those rules as law, regard
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With this background, we can focus on the key elements in Rhode's
critique of legal ethics as that field is understood within the
mainstream of the bar: her hostility to role morality, her attraction to
a "contextual view" of legal ethics, and her belief that lawyers' ethical
choices should be guided by CAEPs and not by (or solely by) legal
ethics codes.
It is not clear whether Professor Rhode means to attack role
morality per se, or only a role for lawyers that is largely defined by the
She criticizes those
principles of Neutrality and Partisanship.
principles for offering lawyers a "conveniently simplified moral
universe"' when true moral responsibility requires a consideration of
"all the societal interests at issue in particular practice contexts.'
Yet she indicates that fulfilling the "distinctive needs of lawyers'
occupational role" is itself a societal interest.'2
In my view, role morality, narrowly and rigidly conceived, can be
very unwholesome, but not all role morality is rigid and narrow.
Moreover, role morality in professional practice has potential benefits
that Rhode does not sufficiently credit. First, by limiting the
considerations that actors must take into account, role morality can
usefully coordinate the expectations of parties who find themselves in
recurrent interactions, such as lawyers and clients, or lawyers and
judges. Second, in fields such as law, where fateful choices must be
made under serious time and information constraints, role morality
may enable practitioners to act who would otherwise be paralyzed by
a moral universe so complex as to constitute what William James
called a "buzzing blooming confusion."' Third, role morality can
foster accountability by identifying the parties-e.g., clients-to whom
the practitioner's primary duties run.' 4 Without identifying lawyers'
primary obligees in advance, their actions might be virtually
them as so regularly in conflict with exogenous moral considerations that they should
be treated as rules of thumb, which seems to be how Rhode would have lawyers and
enforcers treat them. Cf Simon, supra note 1, at 197-203 (supporting a -contextual
view of legal ethics" and, thus, a disciplinary regime analogous to common law
adjudication in legal malpractice cases, where norms "take the form of general
standards, rebuttable presumptions, and illustrative cases"). Professor Rhode never

expresses concern that treating ethics rules as rules of thumb in the interest of
encouraging lawyers to think contextually could conflict with the practical goal of

making lawyers legally accountable for their conduct by subjecting them er ante to the
governance of relatively unequivocal disciplinary rules.
60. Rhode, supra note 3, at 64.

61.
62
63.
(1972)

Id. at 67.
Id.
William R. Bishin & Christopher D. Stone, Law, Language and Ethics 170
(quoting James).

64. See John Leubsdorf, Pluralizingthe Client-Lawyer Relationship,77 Cornell L
Rev. 825, 841-42 (1992) (expressing concern that obscuring the legal distinctions
between clients and nonclients in hopes of encouraging lawyers to take greater

account of currently subordinate nonclient interests could enable lawyers more often
to pursue their own interests with impunity).
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unreviewable.65 Finally, role morality guards against the risk that
actors, biased by strong financial pressures or personal bonds and
unconstrained by role, would misapply their own conceptions of
justice or all-things-considered morality. 66 As Rhode herself notes,
given the pressures of law practice, "attorneys may too often convince
themselves that fundamental values [justify] noncompliance [with
rules]. If the bar's history is any guide, the clients most likely to
benefit from such decision making would not be the poor and
oppressed."'67
The main problem with Rhode's call for a more "contextual" view
of legal ethics is the difficulty of clarifying how lawyers (or their
regulators) should determine the import of contextual variables or
how finely-grained their contextual analysis should be.' Rhode's own
intuitions about these matters do not suggest a methodology; they
illustrate the problem. At several points, she draws a sharp contrast
between advocacy in a criminal defense context and in civil litigation.
She contends that the "justifications of neutral partisanship assume
special force in criminal cases"69 and rejects "[p]roposals to curtail
advocacy for criminal defendants" (since strong pressures already
work against effective representation),70 while insisting that zealous
partisanship is "not necessarily justifiable for civil litigation" because
it can harm legitimate third-party interests.71 Elsewhere, however, she
obscures the ethical significance of her civil-criminal contrast by
contextualizing within the criminal defense field, as when she criticizes
65. There is an analogy here to the case against "corporate constituency statutes,"
which permit or require corporate officers to take actions on behalf of their company
that serve the interests of corporate "stakeholders" in addition to shareholders-e.g.,
bondholders, employees, or the local community. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A
Theoretical and PracticalFramework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes,
70 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 579-80 & n.2 (1992). Since these laws do not define or assign
relative weights to the interests of the various constituencies, their effect in practice
may be to make corporate decisions unreviewable on behalf of any constituency. See
Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional
Interpretationof FiduciaryDuty, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214, 247 (1999) (noting that there is
no consensus about how to define the legal duties that officers and directors owe to
various corporate constituencies and calling the problem of defining those duties
"difficult and perhaps intractable").
66. In other words, "[t]he question of what values actual legal actors ought to hold
in a world that is causally connected in particular ways must be seen as a complex
question requiring positive as well as normative analysis." Christopher T. Wonnell,
Problems in the Application of PoliticalPhilosophy to Law, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 123, 155
(1987).
67. Rhode, supra note 3, at 78.
68. For a more sustained effort to identify contextual factors that should be
considered relevant, see Simon, supra note 1, at 138-69.
69. Rhode, supra note 3, at 54.
70. Id. at 73.
71. Id. at 51. Rhode asserts, for example, that if a civil defendant has suffered no
significant prejudice as a result of a plaintiff's failure to file a substantively justifiable
claim before the statute of limitations ran, the defendant's lawyer should not invoke
the statute to obtain a dismissal, despite the legal validity of that defense. Id. at 71.
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lawyers who use "nuts and sluts" (i.e., blame-the-victim) defenses in
rape cases.7
Rhode also equivocates on the relevance of client poverty as a
contextual factor. "Not all poor clients would be entitled to
unqualified advocacy," she writes, but "neither would factors like
poverty be irrelevant if they affect the justice of a particular claim."3
Yet, she never identifies factors that in her view are like poverty, or
the morally relevant characteristic such factors share with poverty, or
the range of matters in which a client's poverty would bear on the
justness of a claim.74 Instead, she concedes, as I think she must, that
"in a profession as large and diverse as the American bar, different
lawyers will make different judgments about what is in fact just." 5
Since lawyers differ on this, one wonders why getting them to think
contextually can be expected to promote justice-defined either
objectively or by Rhode's lights. 6
Professor Rhode does try to clarify how "general principles of
moral responsibility [i.e., CAEPs] would apply in concrete legal
settings."' She does so by discussing several "hard cases." One such
case arises in representing welfare applicants. "Many impoverished
clients," she writes,
have compelling claims for assistance that the law fails to
acknowledge.... To meet basic subsistence needs, indigent clients
typically have no alternative but to supplement their governmental
support with unreported income.... Lawyers who become aware of
[these] awkward financial facts confront difficulties of their own.
One of my own first cases, as a law student working for a legal aid
office, involved precisely this situation. It appeared obvious from
our client's circumstances that she had undisclosed income that
would have made her technically ineligible for benefits. But without
that support she would have lost the chance to finish an educational
program that could help her escape poverty.... [S]he seemed to be
precisely the kind of recipient whom the statutory scheme was
designed to help. Our office had to decide whether to provide

72. Id. at 101.
73. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
74. Professor Rhode does discuss one concrete situation in which she thinks a
client's poverty would be a morally relevant factor justifying the use of an "evasive
strategy" by lawyers that would otherwise be improper. See infra note 78 and
accompanying text.
75. Rhode, supra note 3, at 79.
76. In fairness, I must admit that Rhode offers no guarantees that a more
contextualized approach to legal ethics will promote justice. She grants that "[tlhe
full effects of [the] approach are difficult to predict," id., and indicates that its
advantage "is not that it promises bright-line answers but, rather, that it promotes
ethically reflective analysis and commitments." Id. at 71. Still, I take Professor
Rhode to be interested in promoting justice, not reflection for reflection's sake.
77. Id. at 71.
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assistance that might help
7 her maintain benefits to which she
probably was not entitled. ?
Rhode never tells us for sure, but I infer that the office helped the
client prepare and file sworn documents that materially
misrepresented her income. Since it was "obvious" that the client had
undisclosed, disqualifying income, the lawyers presumably knew they
were assisting her in a crime or fraud, 79 at least as the term "knew" is
used on the street. Rhode considers it morally justified and "most
compatible" with her contextual ethical framework for lawyers to
provide help in such cases "as long as they refrain from illegal conduct
such as knowing presentation of perjury or preparation of fraudulent
documents.""0 Two questions come quickly to mind: How does
Rhode escape the conclusion that helping clients in such cases
constitutes knowing assistance in fraud and thus is illegal? And what
"commonly accepted ethical principle" would justify the lawyers'
assistance?
On the first question, Rhode declines to rely on the sort of
jurisprudential escape hatch that her colleague, William Simon, might
offer. As she reports, Simon argues that lawyers have a duty to
pursue "substantive justice" and that this duty can "authorize
noncompliance with formal legal requirements," just as the pursuit of
substantive justice can justify jury nullification of an out-of-date or
unduly harsh penal statute.81 As she describes Simon's view, (1)
lawyers should have "discretion to disregard legal rules that...
compromise fundamental values," and (2) "rules that irrationally
support
might justify such
withhold
minimal welfare
noncompliance." ' Simon is not claiming that lawyers should exalt
their own moral values over their duty to obey the law, but rather that
law itself is coterminous with substantive justice. 3 Because Simon
78. Id. at 76-77. Rhode presumably thinks the undisclosed income made the client
only "technically" ineligible on the theory that (1) welfare programs exist to assist
applicants who, like this one, will put their assistance to good use in an effort to
escape poverty and (2) officials who set income limits so low as to disqualify such
applicants are irrationally disserving that goal. But if the "technically ineligible" did
not try to qualify for aid by hiding income, more aid might be freed up for others, with
no income to hide, who would put the aid to equally good use-who, in other words,
would be more than "technically" eligible.
79. If so, they might have committed a crime and would have violated ethical bans
on knowingly assisting clients in crimes or frauds. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct
R. 1.2(d) (1983); Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility, DR 7-102(A)(7) (1983).
80. Rhode, supra note 3, at 77.
81. Id. I am mystified by Simon's unqualified enthusiasm for giving lawyers
discretion to disobey legal commands on the basis of an analogy to jury nullification,
because he acknowledges that many disturbing instances of jury nullification have
occurred, notably in the South in trials of white killers of blacks and civil rights
activists. Simon, supra note 1, at 84.
82. Rhode, supra note 3, at 77.
83. Simon, supra note 1, at 79-108 (contrasting "positivist" theories of law with his
own "substantive" conception of law and attempting to show that the latter plays a
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takes the position that assistance for the poor is inscribed as a
fundamental value somewhere in American law,' he might argue that
it can override a lawyer's duty, inscribed in other law, to refrain from
knowingly assisting in fraud, and that on balance the lawyers who
helped Rhode's welfare client should not be deemed to have acted
unlawfully.s'
Rhode expressly rejects Simon's "troubling" analogy to jury
nullification as a way to justify lawyer noncompliance with formal
legal requirements. 6 And she refuses to condone in any context
"illegal conduct such as knowing presentation of perjury or
preparation of fraudulent documents."t Her position is rather that,
when it would serve commonly accepted ethical values, lawyers
should be permitted, if not expected, to use "evasive strategies that
[are] not technically unlawful" in order to pursue client objectives that
are not "substantively justified,"' including the objective of obtaining
welfare benefits for a "technically ineligible" client. "Selective

ignorance" - avoiding "knowing" assistance in a crime or fraud by
avoiding any information that would clearly reveal it-is such a
strategy. Rhode suggests that, by resorting to that strategy, lawyers in
the legal aid office were able to assist their client without "knowingly"
significant role in American legal culture); id. at 138 (stating that decisions about
justice are neither "assertions of personal preferences" nor "applications of ordinary
morality," but instead are "legal judgments," albeit judgments sensitive to the fact
that law includes "many vaguely specified aspirational norms").
84. See id. at 148-49 (describing a right to basic assistance for those with incomes
below the federal poverty line as one that has been recognized in "some contexts").
85. I presume that Simon would consider lawyers justified in assisting a welfare
client under the circumstances Rhode describes. But given the open-endedness of his
"substantive" theory of law, I cannot be certain. Even if it were contrary to a
fundamental legal value for a state to deny welfare benefits to someone whose income
was below the federal poverty line (but who, taking unreported income into account,
was ineligible for benefits under state law), the pot of welfare funds is limited. It
would not disserve the purpose of welfare and thus be irrational to withhold from that
applicant benefits that would go instead to an otherwise similar applicant whose total
income made her eligible. Moreover, Simon elsewhere argues that if lawyers have
reason to think an agency will be unable to get the information needed to review the
merits of a client's filing (e.g., a tax return), the lawyer should try to remedy agency
ignorance by, for example, flagging the issue. Id. at 142-43. But "flagging" their
client's undisclosed income would have been the last thing on the minds of the
lawyers who assisted Rhode's welfare applicant, even though welfare agencies would
seem to be in no better position than the IRS to discover unreported income.
86. "We can accept nullification," she writes, because it is "public and subject to
some limited review" whereas lawyers' decisions to disobey the law "lack such
accountability." Rhode, supra note 3, at 78. I do not grasp this distinction. The
reasoning seems inapplicable to nullification by criminal juries. It is not always clear
when a jury has engaged in nullification, nor is nullification by criminal juries subject
to effective judicial review.
87. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). By using the words "such as" in the quoted
phrase, Rhode obscures the range of illegalities she has in mind.
88. Id at 77-78 (emphasis added). She describes this as the position "most
compatible" with her "contextual ethical framework." Id. at 77.
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assisting in the client's misrepresentations of her income to the
agency.89
Here, it is Rhode who puts the word "knowingly" in scare quotes,
which is itself an evasive strategy. What it evades is a difficult legal
issue-whether it was lawful for lawyers to assist the welfare client
when it was "obvious" that she had undisclosed income, or was
instead a violation of the ethics rules (and perhaps penal statutes)
forbidding knowing assistance in fraud. Rhode cites nothing in
support of the view that this was lawful. Although an important ABA
ethics opinion has hinted that, for purposes of the ethics rules, lawyers
should not be deemed to know of a client's intention to commit fraud
unless the client acknowledges it,9° Rhode has described that opinion
elsewhere as "clear[ly]" recognizing that a lawyer can be deemed to
know that a client intends to commit perjury (i.e., fraud on a tribunal)
without the client admitting it. 91 Because she never fleshes out an
argument that the legal aid lawyers were indeed operating within the
bounds of the law, Rhode's effort to distinguish her position from
Simon's fails.
Moreover, her position countenances the kind of "it-depends-onthe-meaning-of-sex" equivocation by lawyers that the public
deplores -and deplores, in my judgment, whether it is used to benefit
the wealthy and powerful or the poor. The question becomes whether
Rhode is nonetheless able to identify a commonly accepted ethical
principle that justifies "selective ignorance" on behalf of a welfare
client when, at least for Rhode, the same strategy would be
indefensible in other contexts.
The answer is no. While noting that Congress has tried to bar
government-funded poverty lawyers from lobbying and pursuing
reform litigation for welfare clients,' Rhode refuses to rely on that
point. She claims that "conventional ethical principles [would]
justify" selective ignorance on behalf of welfare clients even if reform

89. Id. at 78.
90. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353
(1987) (stating that in the "unusual case where the lawyer does know, on the basis of
the client's clearly stated intention, that the client will testify falsely at trial.... the
lawyer cannot examine the client in the usual manner"). However, this statement
comes in the context of discussing when a criminal defense lawyer should be deemed
to know that her client intends to commit perjury. As noted earlier, Rhode argues
that the justifications for zealous advocacy have "special force" in the criminal
context. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. And, without focusing on
context, Rhode has chastised lawyers for trying to justify their conduct by
"epistemological demurrer" -i.e., a "skeptic's claim to ignorance" about the merit or
truth of a client's position. Rhode, EthicalPerspectives,supra note 9, at 618-19.
91. Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 271 n.42 (3d ed. 2001).
92. Rhode, supra note 3, at 78. In 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that these
restrictions violated the First Amendment, and thus struck them down. Legal Services
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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prospects were better.9 3 Unfortunately, the closest she comes to
articulating such a principle is this: "An impoverished mother
struggling to escape welfare stands on different ethical footing than a
wealthy executive attempting to escape taxes." 9 The problem with
this "principle," as Monroe Freedman points out, is that even political
conservatives like Rush Limbaugh could embrace it, but their
understanding, contrary to Rhode's, would be that the executive has
the firmer footing!95 In other words, the principle as Rhode intends it

is not a principle the public holds in common; it is deeply contested.
Given her treatment of this "hard case" one suspects that, although
lawyers of various stripes might find a "contextual ethical framework"
rhetorically useful in accounting for their own evasive strategies, the
framework will rarely justify evasion for the sake of promoting justice
in any sense on which there is public (or professional) consensus.
Most legal ethicists will wish for firmer ground to support their views
about how lawyers should behave.96
Similar problems crop up in Rhode's treatment of the "hard cases"
that often arose as late as the 1970s, 97 when, despite changing mores,
some states continued to require petitioners to establish grounds such
as adultery or cruelty in order to obtain a divorce. Rhode identifies
an evasive strategy that lawyers used to obtain divorces for their
clients where the law recognized physical cruelty as a ground but
required proof of two physical assaults separated by a cooling-off
period. "[I]nventive lawyers orchestrated compliance," she writes, by
"witness[ing] one spouse gently slap the other twice, with a civilized
lunch break in between."" Rhode thinks this was "not technically
unlawful,"' but, again, its lawfulness is unclear-unless one regards
whatever conduct enforcers tolerate as ipso facto lawful. The trouble
is that gently slapping one's spouse with his or her consent is clearly
not a legal assault. Relying on such slaps as the requisite assaults for
filing divorce petitions may well have violated ethical1 " or procedural
rules 01 barring frivolous claims. One thing that can be said in favor of

93. Id. at 79.
94. Id. I presume that Rhode would place the impoverished mother on a higher
plane of moral desert than the wealthy executive even if the latter, unlike the former,

was not lying to the government about her income.

95. Monroe H. Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interests of Justice, 70
Fordham L. Rev. 1717, 1726 (2002).

96. See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, supra note 52, at 19-20
(discussing the limitations inherent in theories of legal ethics that are clearly driven by

the aim of enlisting the legal profession in the pursuit of one political perspective at
the expense of other perspectives within mainstream American politics).
97. Rhode, supra note 3, at 78.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(2) (1983).
101. See, eg., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
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Simon's jurisprudence is that, unlike Rhode, he tries to grapple with
such complexities.
I hasten to add that, personally, I am not scandalized by the divorce
lawyers' strategy. And, although I am discomfitted by Rhode's
certitude that lawyers act lawfully when they assist a welfare applicant
who "obviously" has unreported, disqualifying income, I cannot
certify that I would behave differently in their shoes. Moreover, I
firmly believe that my political values are much closer to Deborah
Rhode's than to Rush Limbaugh's. But unlike Rhode, I would not
present these "hard cases" to the public in order to clarify an
"alternative vision" of how lawyers should pursue justice. My view is
instead, the less said about them, the better. We do not appear to
need a new vision of legal ethics in order to get lawyers to behave as
they have in Rhode's hard cases. Besides, I would not wish to give
Mr. Limbaugh any ammunition!

